We provide a tractable concept that can be used to study the influence of the degree of farsightedness on network stability. A set of networks G K is a level-K farsightedly stable set if three conditions are satisfied. First, external deviations should be deterred. Second, from any network outside of G K there is a sequence of farsighted improving paths of length smaller than or equal to K leading to some network in G K . Third, there is no proper subset of G K satisfying the first two conditions. We show that a level-K farsightedly stable set always exists and we provide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of a level-K farsightedly stable set.
of how others might react to changes in the network. But in general, especially when the set of players becomes large, it requires too much foresight on behalf of the players. 4 Our aim is to provide a tractable concept that can be used to study the influence of the degree of farsightedness on network stability. We define the notion of a level-K farsightedly stable set. A set of networks G K is a level-K farsightedly stable set if three conditions are satisfied. First, external deviations should be deterred.
That is, adding a link ij to a network g ∈ G K that leads to a network outside of G K , is deterred by the threat of ending in g . Here g is such that either there is a farsighted improving path of length smaller than or equal to K − 2 from g + ij to g and g belongs to G K or there is a farsighted improving path of length equal to K − 1 from g + ij to g and there is no farsighted improving path from g + ij to g of smaller length. A similar requirement is imposed for the case where a link is severed.
Second, external stability is required or, in other words, the networks within the set should be robust to perturbations. That is, from any network outside of G K there is a sequence of farsighted improving paths of length smaller than or equal to K leading to some network in G K . Third, a minimality condition is required. That is, there is no proper subset of G K satisfying the first two conditions.
We show that a level-K farsightedly stable set always exists and we provide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of a level-K farsightedly stable set. We find that there is a unique level-1 farsightedly stable set G 1 . It is given by the set consisting of all networks that belong to closed cycles, so it includes all pairwise stable networks. Level-K farsighted stability leads to a refinement of myopic stability for generic allocation rules: for any K ≥ 1, the myopically stable set G 1 contains a level-K farsightedly stable set G K . Thus, an analysis based on myopic behavior may not rule out some networks that are not stable when players are sufficiently farsighted. At the same time, a myopic analysis is compatible with farsightedness, and for any value of K there is always a level-K farsightedly stable set that consists (1994) , Xue (1998) exclusively of networks that belong to closed cycles. But, some networks that are not part of any closed cycle may constitute a level-K farsightedly stable set when K strictly exceeds one.
We provide easy to verify conditions for a set to be level-K farsightedly stable.
We also consider the relationship between level-K farsighted stability and efficiency of networks. We show that if there is a network that Pareto dominates all other networks, then that network is the unique prediction of level-K farsighted stability if K is greater than the maximum number of links in a network. In addition, we introduce a property on the allocation rule under which level-K farsighted stability singles out the complete network. Finally, we illustrate the tractability of our new concept by analyzing the criminal network model of Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2004) . We find that in criminal networks with n players, the set consisting of the complete network, so all criminals are linked to each other, is the unique level-(n−1) farsightedly stable set.
Recent experimental and empirical studies suggest that players's initial choices in games often deviate systematically from equilibrium, that structural non-equilibrium level-k (Stahl and Wilson, 1994; Nagel, 1995 ; Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta, 2001) or cognitive hierarchy (Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2004 ) models often outpredict equilibrium, 5 and that players only look a finite number of steps ahead when making choices. 6 We assume that players are limited farsighted, but we do not require that players choose best responses to some beliefs on opponents' strategies.
In our concept, players cannot even think about a strategy since they are not able
to reason about what takes place after a certain reasoning horizon.
Recently, Morbitzer, Buskens and Rosenkranz (2011) develop a model of network formation where players look a finite number of steps ahead when anticipating the reaction of other players to their change. The decision to initiate a change to the 5 Level-k theory and the closely related cognitive hierarchy theory distinguish types of players according to the level at which they reason. Assumptions about level-0 behavior provide an anchor for beliefs and strategies at higher levels. At each higher level, players are assumed to know the probability distributions of strategies at lower levels. Level-1 players choose best responses to level-0 choices, while level-2 players choose best responses to level-1 choices (level-k theory) or to some probability distribution over level-0 and level-1 strategies (cognitive hierarchy theory). See
Crawford, Costa-Gomes and Iriberri (2013) for a review of the literature. network is based on some ad hoc rules that weigh improving paths that might follow their change, but which are not necessarily improving paths for the players who made the initial change. Using computer simulations they show that, in the co-author model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) , limited farsighted players can overcome the tension between stability and efficiency only if the number of players is small. Their concept is a refinement of the set of pairwise stable networks and may therefore fail to exist.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notations and basic properties and definitions for networks. In Section 3 we define the notions of improving paths and level-K pairwise stability and we show that level-K pairwise stable networks may fail to exist. In Section 4 we define the notion of a level-K farsightedly stable set and we characterize it. In Section 5 we study the relationship to pairwise stability. In Section 6 we provide easy to verify sufficient conditions for a set to be level-K farsightedly stable. We look at the relationship between level- 
Networks
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the finite set of players who are involved in some network relationship. The network relationships are reciprocal and the network is thus modeled as a non-directed graph. Individuals are the nodes in the graph and links indicate bilateral relationships between individuals. Thus, a network g is simply a list of which pairs of individuals are linked to each other. We write ij ∈ g to indicate that i and j are linked under the network g. The complete network on the set of players S ⊆ N is denoted g S and is equal to the set of all subsets of S of size 2. 7 It follows in particular that the empty network is denoted by g ∅ . The set of all possible networks or graphs on N is denoted by G and consists of all subsets of g N . The cardinality of G is denoted by n = 2 n(n−1)/2 .
7 Throughout the paper we use the notation ⊆ for weak inclusion and for strict inclusion.
Finally, # will refer to the notion of cardinality.
The network obtained by adding link ij to an existing network g is denoted by
g + ij and the network that results from deleting link ij from an existing network g by g − ij. Let
Thus, g |S is the network found by deleting all links except those that are between players in S. For any network g, let N (g) = {i ∈ N | ∃j ∈ N such that ij ∈ g} be the set of players who have at least one link in the network g.
A path in a network g ∈ G between players i and j of length K ≥ 1 is a finite sequence of players i 0 , . . . , i K with i 0 = i and i K = j such that for any k ∈ {0, . . . , K − 1}, i k i k+1 ∈ g, and such that each player in the sequence i 0 , . . . , i K is distinct. A network g is connected if for each pair of players i and j in N (g) such that i = j there exists a path between i and j in g. This definition implies that the empty network g ∅ is connected. A non-empty network h ⊆ g is a component of g if for all i ∈ N (h) and j ∈ N (h) \ {i}, there exists a path in h connecting i and j, and for any i ∈ N (h) and j ∈ N (g), ij ∈ g implies ij ∈ h. The set of components of g is denoted by C(g). Using the components of a network, we can partition the players into maximal groups within which players are connected. Let P (g) denote the partition of N induced by the network g. That is, the set of player S belongs to P (g) if and only if either there exists a network h in C(g) such that S = N (h) or there exists i / ∈ N (g) such that S = {i}.
An allocation rule is a function Y : G → R N which gives for every player i and network g a payoff Y i (g).
Improving Paths
A farsighted improving path of length K ≥ 0 from a network g to a network g = g is a finite sequence of networks g 0 , . . . , g K with g 0 = g and g K = g such that for any
Since the set {0, . . . , K − 1} is empty for K = 0, this definition implies that there is a farsighted improving path of length 0 from each network g to itself, but clearly there are no farsighted improving paths of length 0 from g to any other network. If there exists a farsighted improving path of length K from g to g , then we write g → K g .
For a given network g and some K ≥ 0, let f K (g) be the set of networks that can be reached from g by a farsighted improving path of length K ≤ K . That is,
This defines f K as a correspondence on the set G. The set of networks that can be reached from g by some farsighted improving path is denoted by f ∞ (g), so
The following lemma follows almost immediately and is presented without proof.
the network g is dropped from f K (g) and the setf K (g) corresponds to the networks different from g that can be reached from g by a farsighted improving path of length at most K (and at least one). Similarly, we definef
An important concept in the analysis of networks is the one of pairwise stability as introduced in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) .
We say that a network g is adjacent to g if g = g + ij or g = g − ij for some ij.
8 A network is pairwise stable if and only if it is not defeated by another network. 9 It is also easy to see that g ∈f 1 (g) if 8 We use the notation (
with at least one inequality holding strictly, ( 9 Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) and Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) introduce the notion of strong stability, where stability of the network against deviations by arbitrary coalitions is required. In the same spirit, our theory of limited farsightedness can easily be modified to study coalitional moves rather than pairwise moves. and only if g defeats g. We can therefore characterize the pairwise stable networks as those g ∈ G for whichf 1 (g) = ∅, or, alternatively, f 1 (g) = {g}. This formulation readily suggests the following stability notion when players are less myopic.
We may replace the condition f K (g) = {g} for level-K pairwise stability by the equivalent conditionf K (g) = ∅.
The set of level-K pairwise stable networks is denoted by P K . The set P K might be worth studying in its own right. However, similar to the case of myopic players, there is no guarantee that this set is non-empty. It follows from Lemma 1 that P K ⊇ P K+1 , so emptiness is more likely to become a problem for higher values of K. 10 In the next section we present a stability notion that does not suffer from this emptiness problem. 
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Lemma 1 extends to compositions of f K and in particular to the transitive closure f ∞ K of f K as is shown in the following lemma, which is presented without proof.
Jackson and Watts (2002) have defined the notion of a closed cycle. A set of networks C is a cycle if for any g ∈ C and g ∈ C \ {g }, there exists a sequence 10 Jackson (2008) defines a network to be farsightedly pairwise stable if there is no farsighted improving path emanating from it. This concept reverts to P ∞ and refines the set of pairwise stable networks. A drawback of the definition is that it does not require that a farsighted improving path ends at a network that is stable itself. The set P ∞ is similar to the farsighted core when only one link at a time can be deleted or added. of improving paths of length 1 connecting g to g , i.e. g ∈ f ∞ 1 (g). A cycle C is a maximal cycle if it is not a proper subset of a cycle. A cycle C is a closed cycle if f ∞ 1 (C) = C, so there is no sequence of improving paths of length 1 starting at some network in C and leading to a network that is not in C. A closed cycle is necessarily a maximal cycle. For every network g ∈ P 1 , the set {g} is a closed cycle. The set of networks belonging to a closed cycle is non-empty.
We next present an example of an investment game as an example to illustrate the notion of farsighted improving paths and to point out some of its subtleties. We compute the farsighted improving paths of length K = 1 from a given network g to find the pairwise stable networks. It can easily be verified that
In an investment game with three or more players, it holds that both the empty network and the complete network are pairwise stable, whereas there are no other pairwise stable networks.
Next we consider the transitive closure of f 1 to compute the closed cycles in the investment game. It can easily be computed that
The empty network g ∅ belongs to f ∞ 1 (g) for every g that is not complete. Now it is not hard to verify that the closed cycles in the investment example coincide with the pairwise stable sets, so are given by the empty and the complete network.
It is a priori reasonable that the complete network is stable. However, this is less clear for the empty network and the question whether the empty network is stable or not should be intimately linked to the number of players and their degree of farsightedness. We continue the example by studying the farsighted improving paths of length K ≥ 2. Despite the subtleties for higher values of K, it is straightforward to verify that the set P K of level-K pairwise stable sets consists of g ∅ and g N when n(n−1)/2 > K and is equal to {g N } otherwise. When the level of farsightedness of players is greater than or equal to n(n − 1)/2, the number of links needed to go from the empty network to the complete network, the complete network emerges as the unique level-K pairwise stable set. The level-K pairwise stable set thereby captures the desired relation between the degree of farsightedness and the instability of the empty network. In many examples, however, the set P K will be empty and can therefore not be used to analyze the relation between the degree of farsightedness and stability.
It also suffers from the drawback that the networks to which players plan to deviate might not be level-K pairwise stable themselves.
Level-K Farsighted Stability
To analyze the influence of the degree of farsightedness on the stability of networks,
we define the notion of a level-K farsightedly stable set. In the next definition, we use the notational convention that f −1 (g) = ∅ for every g ∈ G.
Definition 3. For K ≥ 1, a set of networks G K ⊆ G is a level-K farsightedly stable set with respect to Y if
(iii) ∀G K G K , at least one of the Conditions (ia), (ib), and (ii) is violated by
The move from a network g to an adjacent network is called a deviation. Condition (i) in Definition 3 requires the deterrence of external deviations. Condition (ia)
captures that adding a link ij to a network g ∈ G K that leads to a network outside of G K , is deterred by the threat of ending in g . Here g is such that either there is a farsighted improving path of length smaller than or equal to K − 2 from g + ij to g and g belongs to G K or there is a farsighted improving path of length equal to K − 1 from g + ij to g and there is no farsighted improving path from g + ij to g of smaller length. Condition (ib) is a similar requirement, but then for the case where a link is severed.
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Since level-K farsightedness models a reasoning horizon of the players of length K, we have to distinguish farsighted improving paths of length less than or equal to K − 2 after a deviation from g to g + ij and farsighted improving paths of length equal to K − 1. In the former case, the reasoning capacity of the players is not yet reached, and the threat of ending in g is only credible if it belongs to the farsightedly stable set G K . In the latter case, the only way to reach g from g requires K steps of reasoning or even more; one step in the deviation to g + ij and at least K − 1 additional steps in any farsighted improving path from g + ij to g . Since this
exhausts the reasoning capacity of the players, the threat of ending in g is credible,
irrespective of whether it belongs to G K or not.
Condition (ii) in Definition 3 requires external stability and implies that the networks within the set are robust to perturbations. From any network outside of G K there is a a sequence of farsighted improving paths of length smaller than or equal to K leading to some network in G K . 13 Condition (ii) implies that if a set of networks is level-K farsightedly stable, it is non-empty. Condition (iii) is the minimality condition.
Condition (i) in Definition 3 guarantees that networks inside the set G K are stable for players whose reasoning horizon is of length K. Hence, f K is used for deterring deviations from networks inside the set
requires external stability and also implies robustness to perturbations of networks inside the set G K . Perturbations may be due to exogenous forces acting on the 12 Chwe (1994) defines the notion of largest consistent set. A set G is a consistent set if both external and internal deviations with respect to f ∞ are deterred. The largest consistent is the set that contains any consistent set. 13 Chwe ( For the special case where K is equal to 1, we can use the fact that f −1 (g) = ∅ and f 0 (g) = {g}, so Definition 3 simplifies as follows. Since a farsightedly stable set cannot be empty, it follows from Theorem 3 that there is at least one closed cycle. Level-1 farsightedly stable sets are unique. This result does not carry over to higher levels of K.
Also for K = 2, the definition of a level-K farsightedly stable set simplifies somewhat, since if a network g + ij belongs to G \ G 2 for some set G 2 , it holds that
Theorem 4. A set of networks G 2 ⊆ G is a level-2 farsightedly stable set with
(iii) ∀G 2 G 2 , at least one of the Conditions (ia), (ib), and (ii) is violated by G 2 .
Theorem 4 is useful when computing level-2 farsightedly stable sets in examples.
At the other extreme, when K is greater than or equal to n + 1, it follows from
We therefore have the following result.
It follows immediately from Theorem 5 that the collection of K-farsightedly stable sets is independent of K when K ≥ n + 1. In many applications, the correspondence f ∞ is transitive, in which case it coincides with f ∞ n −1 , and level-∞ farsighted stable sets are identical to level-(n + 1) farsightedly stable sets, but in general it only holds that f
We can therefore conclude that for every level-∞ farsightedly stable set G ∞ there is a set G ⊆ G ∞ such that G is level-(n + 1) farsightedly stable. We will argue next that with n ≥ 3 players, a reasoning horizon of length K equal to n(n−1)/2 or higher is needed to obtain the complete network as the unique level-K farsightedly stable set. For K < n(n − 1)/2, we show that the unique level-K farsightedly stable set consists of the empty and the complete network.
We argue first that {g N } is the unique level-K farsightedly stable set when
The analysis in Example 1 reveals that g N ∈ f 1 (ḡ) for all networksḡ that are adjacent to g N , so by Lemma 1 we have g N ∈ f K−2 (ḡ) for all networksḡ that are adjacent to g N , and Condition (i) of Definition 3 is satisfied since a deviation from g N to an adjacent networkḡ is deterred by the return to g N .
We have argued in Example 2 that
satisfies minimality as expressed in Condition (iii) of Definition 3, so g N is a level-K farsightedly stable set.
it follows that g N ∈ G K for every level-K farsightedly stable set G K . Minimality as expressed by Condition (iii) of Definition 3 now implies that {g N } is the unique level-K farsightedly stable set when K ≥ n(n − 1)/2.
Consider next the case K < n(n − 1)/2. It holds that g N / ∈ f K (g ∅ ), since one needs to form n(n − 1)/2 links to go from the empty to the complete network.
Condition (ii) of Definition 3, it follows that g ∅ ∈ G K for every level-K farsightedly stable set G K . In the previous paragraph we have argued that g N ∈ G K . The analysis in Example 2 reveals that f
Together with Condition (iii) of Definition 3, we now find that {g ∅ , g N } is the unique level-K farsightedly stable set when K < n(n − 1)/2.
The Relation to Pairwise Stability
In this section, we discuss how level-K farsightedly stable sets are related to notions based on pairwise stability such as the set of pairwise stable networks P 1 , the set of closed cycles G 1 , and the set of level-K pairwise stable networks P K .
Theorem 3 implies that any pairwise stable network belongs to G 1 . The following theorem shows that this result carries over to higher values of K.
Theorem 6. For K ≥ 1, the set P K of level-K pairwise stable networks is a subset of any level-K farsightedly stable set G K .
Proof. Suppose G K is level-K farsightedly stable, but does not contain some g ∈ P K .
By Definition 2, we have f K (g) = {g}. We find that f
Theorem 6 shows that any network g from which there are no farsighted improving paths of length smaller than or equal to K to networks different from g belongs to G K . Level-K pairwise stability is quite demanding for higher levels of K. Since
Theorem 6 yields an easy sufficient condition for the uniqueness of a level-K farsightedly stable set as a corollary, where we make use of the minimality requirement as expressed in Condition (iii) of Definition 3.
An allocation rule is said to be generic if for every g, g ∈ G such that g and g are adjacent it holds that either g ∈ f 1 (g ) or g ∈ f 1 (g). If an allocation rule is not generic, then some arbitrarily small perturbation of it will be, and genericity can therefore be thought of as a weak requirement on allocation rules. The next result shows that level-K farsighted stability leads to a refinement of myopic stability for generic allocation rules.
Theorem 7.
Let the allocation rule be generic. For every K ≥ 1, the myopically stable set G 1 contains a level-K farsightedly stable set G K .
Proof. The statement is trivial for K = 1, so we consider K ≥ 2.
We show first that the set G 1 satisfies Condition (i) of Definition 3. Consider some g ∈ G 1 and a deviation to g ∈ G \ G 1 .
Suppose that g ∈ f 1 (g). Since g ∈ G 1 and G 1 contains all networks in a closed cycle by Theorem 3, it follows that g ∈ G 1 , a contradiction to g ∈ G \ G 1 .
Consequently, it holds that g / ∈ f 1 (g).
Since the allocation rule is generic, we find that g ∈ f 1 (g ). We have that g ∈ f 1 (g ) \ {g }, so for K = 2 the deviation from g to g is deterred by g. For
, so again the deviation from g to g is deterred by g.
We show next that the set G 1 satisfies Condition (ii) of Definition 3. Since G 1 is level-1 farsightedly stable, it holds for every g ∈ G \ G 1 that f
Lemma 2 it holds that f
and it follows that G 1 satisfies Condition (ii).
Either the set G 1 is a minimal set satisfying Conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 3 and is therefore level-K farsightedly stable, or it has a proper subset G K which is a minimal set satisfying Conditions (i) and (ii), so G K is level-K farsightedly stable.
In both cases, the statement of the theorem holds.
Theorem 3 asserts that there is a unique level-1 farsightedly stable set G 1 , given by the union of all closed cycles. Theorem 7 shows that higher levels of farsightedness lead to a refinement of the networks that belong to closed cycles. For any value of K, there is always a subset of G 1 that is level-K farsightedly stable. Theorem 7 shows that an analysis based on myopic behavior may not rule out some networks that are not stable when players are sufficiently farsighted. At the same time, a myopic analysis is compatible with farsightedness, and for any value of K there is always a farsightedly stable set that consists exclusively of networks that belong to closed cycles. Table 1 . However, when players are sufficiently farsighted, {g 1 } reemerges as a level-K farsightedly stable set. We consider some K ≥ n + 1 and verify that {g 1 } satisfies the conditions of Theorem 5. As before, the only deviations from g 1 are to g 0 , g 4 , and g 5 . Since f n −1 (g 0 ), f n −1 (g 4 ), and f n −1 (g 5 ) all contain g 1 , such deviations are deterred, and Condition (i) of Theorem 3 is satisfied. Since
1 }, we know that Condition (ii) of Theorem 3 is satisfied by {g 1 }.
Condition (iii) of Theorem 4 is trivially satisfied. It follows that {g 1 } is a level-K farsightedly stable set for every K ≥ n + 1.
Sufficient Conditions for Level-K Farsighted Stability
In this section, we present two sets of sufficient conditions for a set to be level-K farsightedly stable. In many examples, these conditions are easy to verify.
A refinement of pairwise stability is obtained when we require the network g to defeat every other adjacent network, so g ∈ f 1 (g ) for every network g adjacent to g. We call such a network g pairwise dominant. The following definition generalizes this idea and allows for farsighted improving paths of any length K.
Definition 4. For K ≥ 1, a network g is level-K pairwise dominant if for every g adjacent to g it holds that g ∈ f K (g ). The set of level-K pairwise dominant networks is denoted by D K .
It follows immediately from the definition that D 1 ⊆ P 1 . For generic allocation rules, the concepts of pairwise stability and pairwise dominance coincide,
This coincidence does not hold for values of K greater than or equal to 2. By
The first set of sufficient conditions applies to the case where K = 1.
Theorem 8. If g ∈ P 1 and for every g ∈ G \ {g} it holds that g ∈ f ∞ 1 (g ), then {g} is the unique level-1 farsightedly stable set.
Proof. We show that {g} is a level-1 farsightedly stable set by applying Theorem 2.
The uniqueness then follows from Theorem 3. Since g ∈ P 1 it holds that f 1 (g) = {g}, so for a deviation from g to g = g + ij it holds that (
Conditions (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 2 are trivially satisfied.
The next result applies when K ≥ 2.
Theorem 9. Consider some K ≥ 2. If g ∈ D J for some J < K and for every g ∈ G \ {g} it holds that g ∈ f ∞ K (g ), then {g} is a level-K farsightedly stable set. If, moreover, g ∈ P K , then {g} is the unique level-K farsightedly stable set.
Proof. We start by showing that {g} is a level-K farsightedly stable set.
We first consider K = 2 and apply Theorem 4. If K = 2, then the only possibility is that J = 1, so g ∈ D 1 , or equivalently g ∈f 1 (ḡ) for everyḡ adjacent to g.
Condition (i) of Theorem 4 is satisfied since a deviation from g toḡ is deterred by
the return to g ∈f 1 (ḡ). Conditions (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 4 are trivially satisfied.
We next consider K ≥ 3 and apply Definition 3. Since g ∈ D J for some J < K, it holds that g ∈ f J (ḡ) ⊆ f K−1 (ḡ) for everyḡ adjacent to g, where the inclusion uses
ḡ). Condition (i) of Definition 3 is satisfied since a deviation from g toḡ is deterred by the return to
Conditions (ii) and (iii) of Definition 3 are trivially satisfied.
We complete the proof by showing that {g} is the unique level-K farsightedly stable set if in addition g ∈ P K . Since g ∈ f ∞ K (g ) for every g ∈ G \ {g} and g ∈ P K , we have that P K = {g}, and therefore P K is a level-K farsightedly stable set. Corollary 1 yields the desired result.
The conditions of Theorems 8 and 9 are usually easy to verify. To show that g ∈ P 1 requires that f 1 (g) does not contain networks different from g. To show that g ∈ f ∞ 1 (g ) for all g = g, we have to find a sequence of farsighted improving paths of length one that connect g to g. In Theorem 9 the requirement of Theorem 8 that g belongs to P 1 is replaced by the requirement that g ∈ D J for some J < K, so we have to show that g ∈ f J (g ) for all g adjacent to g. The higher J, the weaker is this requirement, so we could replace the requirement g ∈ D J for some
we have to find a sequence of farsighted improving paths of length at most K that connect g to g. Very often the analysis of farsighted improving paths of small lengths is already sufficient. The higher K, the easier it is to satisfy the conditions of Theorem 9 and to find a singleton level-K farsightedly stable set. Finally, to show that g ∈ P K requires that f K (g) does not contain networks different from g. This requirement is more difficult to satisfy for increasing values of K.
We show next how Theorems 8 and 9 can be used to analyze the stability of g 3 in Example 4. In Example 4 it holds that g 3 ∈ P 1 and for every g ∈ G \ {g 3 },
We can then apply Theorem 8 to conclude that {g 3 } is the unique level-1 farsightedly stable set.
In Example 4 it also holds that g 3 ∈ D 1 . Since for every g ∈ G\{g 3 },
We can then apply Theorem 9 to conclude that {g 3 } is a level-K farsightedly stable set for any value of K ≥ 2.
We have illustrated in Example 4 that there are other farsightedly stable sets for higher values of K, in particular {g 1 } can be sustained as a farsightedly stable set for higher values of K. Indeed, for K ≥ 2, f K (g 3 ) contains networks different from g 3 , so the condition g 3 ∈ P K in Theorem 9, which is sufficient for uniqueness of {g 3 } as a level-K farsightedly stable set, does not hold.
In Example 4, {g 1 } has been shown to be a level-2 farsightedly stable set. In 
Combining the conclusions in the previous two sentences and applying Theorem 9 proves that {g 1 } is a level-K farsightedly stable set for any K ≥ 4.
Efficiency and Stability
We now turn to the question of how level-K farsighted stability is related to the efficiency of networks. A network g is strongly efficient if i∈N
Assume that there is a network g that strictly Pareto dominates all other networks. That is, Y i ( g) > Y i (g) for all i ∈ N and for all g ∈ G \ { g}. Hence, g is both Pareto efficient and strongly efficient.
Theorem 10. Assume that the network g strictly Pareto dominates all networks g ∈ G \ { g}. Then, { g} is the unique level-K farsightedly stable set for all K ≥ n(n − 1)/2.
Proof. First, we show that g ∈ D 1 . For all g ∈ G \ { g} , it holds that
for all i ∈ N, so we have that g ∈ f 1 (g) for any network g adjacent to g, so g ∈ D 1 .
Moreover, for every g ∈ G \ { g}, we have that g ∈ f K (g) when K ≥ n(n − 1)/2.
Indeed, all players like to move from g to g given that
and the maximum number of links that one needs to cut or form from g in order to reach g is equal to the number of links in the complete network, n(n − 1)/2. It
Finally, since g strictly Pareto dominates all other networks, we have that f K ( g) = { g} for all K ≥ 1. Thus, g ∈ P K for all K ≥ 1, and by Theorem 9 we have that { g} is the unique level-K farsightedly stable set for all K ≥ n(n − 1)/2.
In the investment game of Example 1, the complete network g N strictly Pareto dominates all other networks. Hence, from Theorem 10 we have that {g N } is the unique level-K farsightedly stable set for all K ≥ n(n−1)/2. Observe that Theorem 10 holds for levels of farsightedness relatively small as compared to the total number of possible networks.
There are many situations where a Pareto dominating network does not exist. We therefore turn our attention to allocation rules satisfying increasing returns to link
creation. An allocation rule Y displays no externalities across components (NEC) if for every g ∈ G, for every h ∈ C(g), we have Y i (g) = Y i (h) for all i ∈ N (h) and
If an allocation rule satisfies NEC, then it is sufficient to specify the allocation rule for connected networks. The set of connected networks is denoted by C.
Consider some allocation rule Y and let
be the set of non-empty connected networks with non-negative aggregate payoffs.
The allocation rule Y satisfies increasing returns to link creation (IRL) 14 if:
at least one inequality holding strictly.
(iv) There exists h ∈ C + (Y ) such that for all h ∈ C with h h , for all i ∈ N (h ),
If an allocation rule satisfies increasing returns to link creation, then by Condition (iv) there is a non-empty connected network h for which the payoff of all players having at least one link is greater than the payoffs they could obtain in any
By Condition (ii), the aggregate payoffs in any connected network containing h are non-negative, and it follows in particular that i∈N Y i (g N ) ≥ 0. For the investment game in Example 1 it holds that K = n(n − 1)/2 and K = Proof. First, we show that g N ∈ D 1 . We argued before that IRL implies
with at least one inequality holding strictly. It follows that g N ∈ f 1 (g) for any network g adjacent to g N , so g N ∈ D 1 .
To apply Theorem 9, or Theorem 8 when K = 1, we need to show that
(a) First, consider any network g ∈ G having a component h ∈ C(g ) such that i∈N Y i (h ) < 0. By Condition (ii) of IRL it follows for any non-empty and connected h ⊆ h that i∈N Y i (h) < 0, so h does not contain a critical network.
Moreover, for any non-empty h ⊆ h there is a player i ∈ N (h) who has a payoff Y i (h) < 0, and so i has incentives to cut a link, say link ij, foreseeing the empty network where Y i (g ∅ ) = 0. We have that g ∅ ∈ f K (h ), and therefore that g \ h ∈ f K (g ).
If g \ h has a component h ∈ C(g \ h ) such that i∈N Y i (h ) < 0, then we can use the argument of the previous paragraph to obtain that g
and therefore that g \ (h ∪ h ) ∈ f 2 K (g ). Repeating this argument a finite number of times, we arrive at a network g that is either equal to g ∅ or has only components belonging to C + (Y ).
(b) Second, consider the empty network g ∅ . From Condition (iv) of IRL, there is a network h ∈ C + (Y ) such that for all h ∈ C with h h it holds that
for all i ∈ N (h ). In particular, we have that
h be such a network with K links. The players in N (h ) have incentives to form sequentially the missing links in
(c) Third, consider any non-empty network g = g N having only components in C + (Y ) and let i be a player in N (g ) with degree d i (g ) < n − 1. Let j ∈ N be such that ij / ∈ g . It follows from Conditions (i) and (ii) of IRL that all components of g + ij belong to C + (Y ). We find by Conditions (i) and (iii) of IRL that
with at least one inequality strict, so g + ij ∈ f 1 (g ).
Repeating this argument m times, where m is the number of links in g N \ g , we find that g N ∈ f m 1 (g ). Theorem 9 now implies that g N is a level-K farsightedly stable set for all
In the symmetric connections model, there is a sequence of improving paths of length 1 from any g = g N to g N when c < δ(1 − δ). Hence, if c < δ(1 − δ), then
, and {g N } is the unique level-K farsightedly stable set for all K ≥ 1. In this model, the complete network is strongly efficient.
Criminal Networks
There is empirical evidence suggesting that peer effects and the structure of social interactions matter strongly in explaining an individual's own criminal or delinquent behavior. Here, we present a simplified version of their model, which puts emphasis on the formation of links and keeps the level of criminal activities of the players fixed.
Throughout this section, we assume n ≥ 3. The players are referred to as criminals. Given some criminal network g, the elements of P (g) are called criminal groups. Each criminal group S has a positive probability p S (g) of winning the loot B > 0. It is assumed that the bigger the criminal group, the higher its probability of getting the loot. This assumption captures the idea that delinquents learn from other criminals belonging to the same group how to commit crime in a more efficient way by sharing the know-how about the technology of crime. We assume that the probability of winning the loot is given by p S (g) = #S/n.
The network architecture determines how the loot is shared among the criminals in the group. Consider some Player i ∈ N and let S ∈ P (g) be the criminal group i belongs to. We define c i (g) = max j∈S d j (g) as the maximum degree in this criminal group. A criminal i who is part of a group S ∈ P (g) expects a share α i (g) of the loot given by
That is, within each criminal group, the criminal that has the highest number of links gets the loot. If two or more criminals have the highest number of links, then they share the loot equally among them.
Criminal i has a probability q i (g) of being caught, in which case his rewards are punished at a rate φ > 0. It is assumed that the higher the number of links a criminal has, the lower his individual probability of being caught. We assume that the probability of being caught is simply given by
The total payoffs of criminal i belonging to criminal group S ∈ P (g) are therefore equal to
We require φ < n/(n − 1) to guarantee that payoffs are non-negative and positive for a player with the highest degree in his group. Table 2 shows the farsighted improving paths for the different possible values of K. It can be verified that the farsighted improving paths for the 3-player case do not depend on the specific choices for B and φ.
Theorem 9 that {g 7 } is the unique level-K farsightedly stable set. If criminals behave myopically, they may not go beyond forming a single link in the three player case. But with a degree of farsightedness of at least 2, the complete criminal network emerges as the unique prediction.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the analysis of criminal networks with a general number n of players. As in the 3-criminal case, there are many networks that are pairwise stable in the n-person case. The complete network is easily verified to be pairwise stable. The generalization of the networks g 1 , g 2 , and g 3 for the 3-criminal case to the n-criminal case would be any network consisting of complete components, where no two components have the same degree. But also any network with a single component where all players have a degree at least equal to two and one player has a degree that is at least two times higher than the degree of any other player is pairwise stable.
We will argue next that {g N } is a level-K farsightedly stable set whenever K ≥ n − 1.
We show first that the complete network is pairwise dominant.
Lemma 3. For criminal networks it holds that
Proof. Consider the network g N − ij for some ij. It holds that
and
We show next that the complete network can be reached from any starting network by repeated application of at most n − 1 degrees of farsightedness.
Lemma 4. For criminal networks, it holds for every
Proof.
Step 1. If g has a component which is not complete, then there is g ∈ f n−1 (g) such that g g .
Let S ∈ P (g) be a criminal group such that some internal links are missing, g |S = g S .
If for every i ∈ S it holds that d i (g) = c i (g), so all players in S have the same degree, then any two players i and j in S create a link to form the network g + ij and improve their payoffs since the increase in their degree increases the share in the loot and lowers the probability of being caught for both players, α i (g + ij) > α i (g),
and Y j (g + ij) > Y j (g). We have that g → 1 g + ij, so clearly g + ij ∈ f n−1 (g).
If the players in S do not all have the same degree, let i ∈ S be a player with 
If c i (g) < #S − 1, then let j ∈ S be a player with
with Player j to form the network g + ij. It holds that
In this case we have that g → 1 g + ij, so clearly g + ij ∈ f n−1 (g).
Step 2. If all components of g are complete and g = g N , then there is g ∈ f n−1 (g) such that g g .
The assumptions of
Step 2 imply that g consists of at least two criminal groups. Let S 1 and S 2 be two criminal groups in P (g).
If #S 1 = #S 2 , then form a link between a Player i ∈ S 1 and a Player j ∈ S 2 .
Since q i (g) > q i (g + ij), we have that
By the same calculation, it follows that Y j (g) < Y j (g + ij), so g → 1 g + ij, and therefore g + ij ∈ f n−1 (g).
Otherwise, it holds without loss of generality that #S 1 < #S 2 . Select some player i ∈ S 1 and a set J consisting of #S 2 + 1 − #S 1 players in S 2 , who link consecutively to Player i to form network g . The resulting finite sequence of networks is denoted g 0 , . . . , g K with g 0 = g and g K = g . Notice that K ≤ n − 1. We show next that for every k ∈ {0, . .
, where j k ∈ J is such that g k+1 = g k + ij k , thereby proving that (g 0 , . . . , g K ) is a farsighted improving path and completing the proof of Step 2.
For every player j ∈ J we have
and for all other players the degree is strictly less than c i (g K ), so
For k = 0, we have
where we use q i (g 0 ) > q i (g K ) and q j 0 (g 0 ) > q j 0 (g K ) to get the strict inequalities.
For k = 1, . . . , K − 1, it holds that Player i is connected to Player j 0 , so
Similarly, it holds that
Step 3. For every g ∈ G \ {g N }, it holds that g N ∈ f ∞ n−1 (g). By combining the results of Step 1 and Step 2, we have that for every g ∈ G \ {g N }, there is g ∈ f n−1 (g) with strictly more links than g. Since the complete network g N has n(n − 1)/2 links, we find that g N ∈ f n(n−1)/2 n−1
Using Theorem 9 we prove now that the complete network {g N } is a level-K farsightedly stable set for every K ≥ n − 1. 18 Notice that the level of farsightedness needed to sustain the complete network {g N } is quite small when compared to the number of potential networks and the maximum length of paths.
Theorem 12. For criminal networks it holds that {g N } is a level-K farsightedly stable set for every K ≥ n − 1.
Proof. By Lemma 3 we have that g N ∈ D 1 . By Lemma 4 we have that for every
, where the inclusion follows from Lemma 2. We are now in a position to apply Theorem 9 and conclude that {g N } is a level-K farsightedly stable set. 18 Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) show that in the example of criminal networks with n players, the complete network {g N } is a pairwise farsightedly stable set.
How about the uniqueness of {g N } as a level-K farsightedly stable set? It is tempting to use the approach of Theorem 9 and show such a result by proving that g N ∈ P K . However, consider the case with 6 players and let g = g N −16−26−35−45.
For any value of B and φ, 19 we claim that g ∈ f 12 (g N ), so g N / ∈ P 12 . Since the network g is connected, We conclude this section by showing that if players are not too farsighted, then g N ∈ P K , so {g N } is the unique level-K farsightedly stable set. More precisely, we will from now on consider K = n − 1. We show first that any network in f n−1 (g N ) has a single component involving all players.
Lemma 5. For criminal networks it holds for every g ∈ f n−1 (g N ) that P (g ) = {N }.
Proof. Consider the criminal group S of Player 1 in g . We show that it contains all players. Suppose it contains only s ≤ n − 1 players. Then, starting from g N , those
s players have to cut all their links with all other players in N \ S. This involves at least s(n − s) steps. For fixed n, the concavity of s(n − s) in s implies that it is minimized at s = 1 or s = n − 1. Substitution of these values of s shows the minimum to be equal to n − 1 at both s = 1 and s = n − 1. When the s players cut all their links with all other players in N \ S, all the players in N are strictly worse off, since the probability of being caught has strictly increased and the probability 19 We maintain the assumption that φ < n/(n − 1).
of winning the loot has decreased, contradicting g ∈ f n−1 (g N ).
We show next that the complete network g N is level-(n − 1) pairwise stable.
Lemma 6. For criminal networks it holds that g N ∈ P n−1 .
Proof. Suppose g is an element off n−1 (g N ). Let g 0 , . . . , g K with g 0 = g N and g K = g be a farsighted improving path of length K ≤ n − 1. By Lemma 5 it holds that c i (g ) is independent from i, so we denote it by c. Let M ⊆ N be such that i ∈ M if and only if d i (g ) = c and denote the cardinality of M by m. It cannot be that m = n, since then all players have lower payoffs in g than in g N because the probability of being caught is higher in g than in g N . Since g is connected by
Lemma 5, it follows that Y j (g ) = 0 for all j ∈ N \ M . A player j ∈ N \ M will therefore not sever a link at any network in the farsighted improving path g 0 , . . . , g K .
It follows that
Since
Since at least one link ij with i ∈ M and j ∈ N is missing in g , it follows that the maximum degree in g satisfies c ≤ n − 2.
The number K is equal to the number of times a link ij is severed with i ∈ M and j ∈ N \ M plus the number of times a link ij is cut with i, j ∈ M plus the number of link additions. We argue next that lower bounds for these three numbers are given by 2(n − m), 2m − n − 1, and 1, respectively.
Since all players in N \ M experienced the severance of at least two links, and any such link is cut by a player in M , a lower bound for the first number is 2(n − m).
be the set of players with degree n − 1 and let (g k ) = #L(g k ) be its cardinality. Clearly, it holds that (g N ) = n and (g ) = 0. Let k be the lowest value of k such that (
The sum of the cardinality (g k ) of L(g k ) and the cardinality m of M is therefore at least 2m − 1. Since there are only n players, it follows that #(L(g k ) ∩ M ), the cardinality of the set of players in L(g k ) that belong to M , is at least 2m − n − 1.
, since the loot has to be shared with less or the same number of criminals and the probability of being caught is strictly less when comparing g k to g . Such a player i will therefore never choose to sever a link himself, so whenever a link involving player i ∈ L(g k ) is severed when going from g k to g k+1 , it must be by a player in M \ L(g k ). It follows
we find that going from g k to g involves the deletion of at least 2m − n − 1 links ij with i, j ∈ M .
We argue next that the move from g K−1 to g K involves a link addition. Suppose not, then there is ij with i ∈ M such that
it follows that at g K , i has to share the loot with more criminals and has a higher probability of being caught than at
), leading to a contradiction. Consequently, the move
We have proved that K ≥ 2(n − m) + 2m − n − 1 + 1 = n, which contradicts our original supposition that K ≤ n − 1. Consequently, it holds thatf n−1 (g N ) = ∅.
Using Theorem 9 we prove now that the complete network {g N } is the unique level-(n − 1) farsightedly stable set.
Theorem 13. For criminal networks it holds that {g N } is the unique level-(n − 1) farsightedly stable set.
∞ n−1 (g ). By Lemma 6 it holds that g N ∈ P n−1 .
We are now in a position to apply Theorem 9 and conclude that {g N } is the unique level-(n − 1) farsightedly stable set.
Structural properties of criminal networks must be taken into account to better understand the impact of peer influence on delinquent behavior and to address adequate and novel delinquency-reducing policies. Hence, it is important to acquire knowledge about the level of farsightedness of criminals to determine which criminal networks are likely to emerge in the long run. by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing criminal activities. They find that the optimal enforcement policy consists of removing some key player or some key group. Such a policy is complex since it depends both on the wage and on the network. Indeed, the removal of some players may induce further voluntary moves of other players who now find it profitable to leave their criminal activities and join the labor market.
We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are limited farsighted. Pairwise stability is a very important tool in network analysis. One shortcoming of pairwise stability is the lack of farsightedness. Players do not anticipate that other players may react to their changes. However, farsighted stability often requires too much foresight on behalf of the players. Hence we propose an intermediate concept, namely level-K farsighted stability, that can be used to study the influence of the degree of farsightedness on network stability.
In the present paper, we assume that all players have a reasoning horizon of length K, where K can be any natural number. By doing so we cover myopic and full farsighted behavior as extreme cases, and we are able to provide a tractable concept to study the influence of the degree of farsightedness on the predictions of network Which is the level of farsightedness needed to obtain the predictions for completely farsighted firms? How do the predictions about stable R&D networks relate to the degree of farsightedness? We argue here that our concept could be used as a first step in trying to answer all these questions.
